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Abstract
We develop a modal logic to capture partial awareness. The
logic has three building blocks: objects, properties, and con-
cepts. Properties are unary predicates on objects; concepts are
Boolean combinations of properties. We take an agent to be
partially aware of a concept if she is aware of the concept
without being aware of the properties that define it. The logic
allows for quantification over objects and properties, so that
the agent can reason about her own unawareness. We then
apply the logic to contracts, which we view as syntactic ob-
jects that dictate outcomes based on the truth of formulas. We
show that when agents are unaware of some relevant proper-
ties, referencing concepts that agents are only partially aware
of can improve welfare.
1 Introduction
Standard models of epistemic logic assume that agents are
logically omniscient: they know all valid formulas and logi-
cal consequences of their knowledge. There have been many
attempts to find models of knowledge that do not satisfy
logical omniscience. One of the most common approaches
involves awareness. Roughly speaking, an agent i cannot
know a valid formula ϕ if i is unaware of ϕ. For exam-
ple, an agent cannot know that either quantum computers
are faster than conventional computers or they are not if she
is not aware of the notion of quantum computer.
There have been many attempts to capture unaware-
ness in the computer science, economics, and phi-
losophy literature, ranging from syntactic approaches
(Fagin and Halpern 1988), to semantic approaches in-
volving lattices (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2006),
to identifying the lack of awareness of ϕ with an
agent neither knowing ϕ nor knowing that she
does not know ϕ (Modica and Rustichini 1994;
Modica and Rustichini 1999). Most of the at-
tempts involved propositional (modal) logics,
although there are papers that use first-order
quantification as well (Board and Chung 2009;
Sillari 2008). However, none of these approaches are
rich enough to capture what we will call partial unaware-
ness.
Perhaps the most common interpretation of lack of aware-
ness identifies the lack of awareness of ϕ with the senti-
ment “ϕ is not on my radar screen”. With this interpretation,
partial awareness becomes “some aspects of ϕ are on my
radar screen”.1 Consider an agent who is in the market for
a new computer. She might be completely unaware of quan-
tum computers, never having heard of one at all. Such an
agent cannot reason about her value for having a quantum
computer, nor think about for which tasks a quantum com-
puter would be useful. But this is an extreme case. A slightly
more aware agent might be aware of (the concept of) quan-
tum computers, having read a magazine article about them.
She might understand some properties of quantum comput-
ers, for example, that they can factor integers faster than a
conventional computer, but be unaware of the notion of qubit
state on which quantum computing is based. Such an agent
may well be able to reason about her value of a quantum
computer despite her less then full awareness.
To capture such partial awareness more formally, we con-
sider a logic with three building blocks: objects, properties,
and concepts. We take a property to be a unary predicate, so
it denotes a subset of objects in the domain;2 a concept is
a Boolean combination of properties. In each state (possible
world), each agent is aware of a subset of objects, properties,
and concepts.
The use of concepts in the context of awareness, which is
(to the best of our knowledge) original to this paper, is crit-
ical in our approach, and is how we capture partial aware-
ness. For a simple example of how we use it, suppose that
a quantum computer (Q) is defined as a computer (C) that
possesses an additional “quantum property” QP . That is,
Q is defined to be C ∧ QP (more precisely, we will have
∀x(Q(x) ⇔ C(x) ∧ QP(x)) as a domain axiom). A “par-
tially aware” agent might be aware of the concept of a quan-
tum computer but unaware of the specific Boolean combi-
nation of properties that characterizes it. Contrast this to the
cases where the agent is fully unaware (she is unaware of
even the concept of a quantum computer) or fully aware (she
1Lack of awareness of ϕ has also been identified with the in-
ability of compute whether ϕ is true (due to computational limi-
tations). We do not consider this interpretation in this paper, but
partial awareness makes sense for it as well—now partial aware-
ness becomes “I can compute whether some aspects of ϕ are true.”
2We could easily extend our approach to allow arbitrary k-ary
predicates, but this would complicate the presentation. Restricting
to unary predicates allows us to focus on the more interesting new
conceptual issues.
is aware of both the concept of a quantum computer and also
what it means to be one, i.e., the properties C andQP ).
Once we have awareness in the language, we need to con-
sider what an agent knows about her own awareness (and
lack of it). This is critical in order to capture many interest-
ing economic behaviors. For example, an agent might know
(or at least believe it is possible) that there are aspects of
a quantum computer about which she is unaware (in our
example, this happens to be QP ). In the spirit of Halpern
and Reˆgo (2009; 2013) (HR from now on), we capture
this using quantification over properties:Ki(∃P∀x(Q(x)⇔
C(x)∧P (x))); although i is unaware of how quantum com-
puters differ from conventional computers, she knows that
there is a distinction that is captured by some property P .
While the agent is unaware of the property QP , so can-
not reason explicitly about it, she is aware that there is some
property that relates C and Q. This allows her to reason at
a sophisticated level about QP . For example, for an arbi-
trary propertyR, the statementKi
(
∀P∀x((Q(x)⇔ C(x)∧
P (x)) ⇒ (P (x) ⇒ R(x))
)
, combined with the definition
of quantum computer, implies that the agent knows thatQP
implies R, even though she is unaware of QP . Despite her
(partial) unawareness of the notion of quantum computer,
the agent can reach some substantive conclusions.
With unawareness, an agent may in general be uncertain
about the relation between C andQ; for example, she might
also envision a state where a quantum computer is a com-
puter that satisfies one of two properties, either QP or QP ′,
but cannot articulate statements that distinguish QP from
QP ′. So if the agent wishes to purchase a QP -computer but
not a QP ′-computer, she cannot do so. This lack of aware-
ness has important consequences in market settings.
Consider a seller of quantum computers who is fully
aware and has the ability to teach the buyer; specifically,
he can expand the buyer’s awareness, allowing her to dis-
criminate between QP and QP ′ computers. It is instructive
to compare the case of unawareness with the more standard
case of uncertainty (with full awareness) in this setting. In
environments of pure uncertainty, the buyer and seller are
assumed to have a common (and fully understood) space
of uncertainty, where each state fully resolves all payoff-
relevant uncertainty. That is, although they may have uncer-
tainty, both the buyer and seller understand exactly what in-
formation is required in order to resolve the uncertainty. A
state contains all the relevant information, so, given a state,
both the buyer and seller can (at least in principle) place a
price on all the relevant options.
Suppose that we model the example above using two
states: s, in which c is a QP -computer, and s′, in which c
is QP ′-computer. If the buyer knows that the seller knows
the state, and the seller can reveal his information in a cred-
ible way, then we can assume without loss of generality that
he will always do so and a transaction will take place only
in state s. To see why, note that in state s, the seller’s dom-
inant strategy is to reveal his information, ensuring a sale.
Because the buyer knows that the seller knows the state, she
will interpret no information as a signal that the state is s′.
Thus, in either case the state is revealed.3
If the buyer does not know whether the seller knows the
state, or if the seller cannot credibly reveal the state, the ar-
gument above fails; receiving no information could plausi-
bly be the consequence of an uninformed seller. If and when
information is revealed or a transaction takes place now de-
pends on the beliefs of the agents. However, an enforceable
contract can remedy the situation: a contract that stipulates
the sale of the computer conditional on the true state being s
results in essentially the same outcome as the case where the
buyer knows that the seller knows the true state of the world:
the buyer ends up with the computer if and only if the state
is s. The fact that the buyer and seller agree on the underly-
ing state space (i.e., the set of possible states of the world)
makes it possible for an enforceable contract to overcome
information asymmetries.
We now turn to the situation with unawareness. If the
buyer knows that the seller is aware of all the intricacies of
his product, then an analogous argument to the one above
shows that we get the same outcome as in the case of un-
certainty. That is, if the buyer believes the seller is himself
aware of the distinction between QP and QP ′, then she
could decide to purchase a computer c only if he teaches
her about the properties and if QP(c) is true.
On the other hand, if the buyer does not know what the
seller is aware of, then we get a significant divergence be-
tween the situation with awareness and uncertainty. With
unawareness, the seller will again not volunteer information,
but the buyer cannot draw up a contract guaranteeing her the
product she wants, since she cannot articulate the difference
between the states. The efficacy of contracts relies critically
on the parties’ common knowledge of the state space, which
in general does not hold in the presence of unawareness.
Note the critical role of the “partialness” of awareness
here. If the buyer were fully aware of the concept, in the
sense of her being aware of the properties that define it, she
could write the relevant contracts and we would have a case
of pure uncertainty. On the other hand, if she were com-
pletely unaware of quantum computers, she would not be
able to reason about her value, or even consider buying one.
The introduction of concepts allows us to consider agents
with different levels of awareness. For example, perhaps a
buyer becomes aware of a particular company that is offer-
ing a commercial quantum computer understood to be char-
acterized by the concept T . If the buyer knows that T is such
that ∀x
(
T (x) ⇔ C(x) ∧ QP ′(x)
)
, then the buyer, without
being explicitly aware ofQP orQP ′, can nonetheless artic-
ulate her desire to purchase a QP but not a QP ′ computer.
Indeed, the buyer can write a contract that gives her the right
3This argument does not rely on the fact that there are only
two states. Suppose that there are n states, say s1, . . . , sn, and the
buyer is willing to pay pi for the computer if the true state is si,
with p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn. Assume that the seller is willing to sell
at any positive price. An easy induction on k shows that, without
loss of generality, if the true state is sk, the seller might as well
reveal this fact, as long as the buyer puts positive probability on
a state k′ < k. (A formalization of this argument also requires
common knowledge of rationality, or, more precisely, sufficiently
deep knowledge of rationality.)
to return the computer c in the event that T (c) is true. In
other words, the concept T acts as a proxy for the property
QP , allowing the buyer to circumvent her scant awareness.
Note that the observations above help to explain the preva-
lence of costly litigation and contractual disputes. In the
world of pure uncertainty, it can be shown that contracts
are always upheld in equilibrium. Indeed, if uncertainty re-
solved in such a way as to make some party renege, then this
could be foreseen, and could be addressed by an appropriate
contract, avoiding costly litigation. However, when parties
are aware of different concepts, optimal complete contracts
cannot be drawn up, setting up a barrier to efficient trade. A
legal system that punishes the strategic concealment of in-
formation can help to facilitate trade, as it provides recourse
for unaware buyers who get swindled.
2 A logic of partial awareness
In this section, we introduce our logic of partial awareness.
2.1 Syntax
The syntax of our logic has the following building blocks:
• A countable set Ø of constant symbols, representing ob-
jects. Following Levesque (1990), we assume that Ø con-
sists of a nonempty set of standard names d1, d2, . . .,
which may be finite or countably infinite.4 Intuitively, the
standard names will represent the domain elements. We
explain the need for these shortly.
• A countably infinite set VØ of object variables, which
range over objects.
• A countable set P of unary predicate symbols.
• A countably infinite set VP of predicate variables.
• A countable set C of concept symbols.
If d ∈ Ø, x ∈ VØ, P ∈ P , Y ∈ VP , and C ∈ C ,
then P (d), P (x), Y (d), Y (x), C(d), and C(x) are atomic
formulas. Starting with these atomic formulas, we construct
the set of all formulas recursively: As usual, the set of for-
mulas is closed under conjunction and negation, so if ϕ and
ψ are formulas, then so are ¬ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ. We allow quan-
tification over objects and over unary predicates, so that if
ϕ is a formula, x ∈ VØ, and Y ∈ VP , then ∀xϕ and ∀Y ϕ
are formulas. Finally, we have two families of modal oper-
ators: taking {1 . . . n} to denote the set of agents, we have
modal operators A1, . . . , An and K1, . . . ,Kn, representing
awareness and (explicit) knowledge, respectively. Thus, if ϕ
is a formula, then so is Aiϕ and Kiϕ. Let Ł(Ø,P,C ) de-
note the resulting language. A formula that contains no free
variables is called a sentence.
2.2 Semantics
Amodel over the language Ł(Ø,P,C ) has to give meaning
to each of the syntactic elements in the language. We use
the standard possible-worlds semantics of knowledge. Thus,
a model includes a set Ω of possible states or worlds (we
use the two words interchangeably) and, for each agent i, a
4Levesque required there to be infinitely many standard names.
binary relation Ki on worlds. The intuition is that (ω, ω′) ∈
Ki (sometimes denoted ω′ ∈ Ki(ω)) if, in world ω, agent i
considers ω′ possible.
Following HR, we assume that each state ω is associ-
ated with a language. Formally, there is a function Φ on
states such that Φ(ω) = (Øω,Pω,Cω), where Øω = Ø,
Pω ⊆ P , and Cω ⊆ C . We discuss the reason for associ-
ating a language with each state below. Let Ł(Φ(ω)) denote
the language associated with state ω. We also assume that
associated with each state ω and agent i, there is the set of
constant, predicate, and concept symbols that the agent is
aware of; this is given by the function A. At state ω, each
agent can only be aware of symbols that are in Φ(ω). Thus,
Ai(ω) ⊆ Φ(ω). We assume that all agents are aware of the
standard names at every state, so that A(ω) includesØ.
Like Levesque (1990), we take the domainD of a model
over Ł(Ø,P,C ) to consist of the standard names in Ø. An
interpretation I assigns meaning to the constant and predi-
cate symbols in each state; more precisely, for each state ω,
we have a function Iω takingØ to elements of the domainD,
P to subsets ofD, and C to Boolean combinations of prop-
erties (i.e., predicates). This last item requires some explana-
tion. Although elements of Ø and P are mapped to seman-
tic objects (elements in the domain and sets of elements in
the domain, respectively), elements of C are mapped to syn-
tactic objects: Boolean combinations of properties. Let Lbc
denote the Boolean combination of properties; if P ′ ⊆ P ,
let Lbc(P ′) denote the Boolean combination of properties
in P ′. We require that Iω(C) ∈ Lbc(Φ(ω)), so that the
Boolean combination defining C in state ω must be express-
ible in Ł(Φ(ω)), the language of ω. We sometimes write cIω
rather than Iω(c), P
I
ω rather than Iω(P ), and C
I
ω rather than
Iω(C). We assume that standard names are mapped to them-
selves, so that (di)
I
w = di.
Putting this together, a model for partial awareness has the
form
M = (Ω, D,Φ,A1 . . . ,An,K1, . . . ,Kn, I).
The truth of a sentence ϕ ∈ Ł(Ø,P,C ) at a state ω in
M is defined recursively as follows.
• (M,ω) |= P (d) iff P (d) ∈ Ł(Φ(ω)) and d ∈ P Iω ,
• (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ł(Φ(ω)) and (M,ω) 6|= ϕ,
• (M,ω) |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff (M,ω) |= ϕ and (M,ω) |= ψ,
• (M,ω) |= C(d) iff C(d) ∈ Ł(Φ(ω)) and (M,ω) |=
CIω(d),
• (M,ω) |= ∀xϕ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ[x/d] for all constant sym-
bols d ∈ Ø, where ϕ[x/d] denotes the result of replacing
all free occurrences of x in ϕ by d,
• (M,ω) |= ∀Y ϕ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ[Y/ψ], where ψ ∈
Lbc(Φ(ω)),5
• (M,ω) |= Aiϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ł(Ai(ω)),
5There is an abuse of notation here. For example, if ψ is P ∧
(Q ∨ R) and ϕ is Y (d), then ϕ[Y/ψ] is P (d) ∧ (Q(d) ∨ R(d));
that is, we apply the arguments of ϕ to all predicates in the ψ. We
hope that the intended formula is clear in all cases.
• (M,ω) |= Kiϕ iff (M,ω) |= Aiϕ and (M,ω′) |= ϕ for
all ω′ ∈ Ki(ω).
Note that what we are calling knowledge here is
what has been called explicit knowledge in earlier
work (Fagin and Halpern 1988; Halpern and Reˆgo 2009;
Halpern and Reˆgo 2013): for agent i to know a formula ϕ,
i must also be aware of it. Traditionally, Ki has been re-
served for implicit knowledge (where no awareness has been
required), and Xi has been used to denote explicit knowl-
edge (where Xiϕ is defined as Kiϕ ∧ Aiϕ). Since we do
not use implicit knowledge in this paper, we have decided to
use the more mnemonic Ki for knowledge, even though it
represents explicit knowledge.
For the remainder of the paper, we restrict to models
where agents know what they are aware of and knowl-
edge essentially satisfies what are called the S5 properties.
Specifically, we restrict to models M where each Ki is an
equivalence relation and if ω ∈ Ki(ω′), then Ai(ω) =
Ai(ω′). This implies that Ai(ω) ⊆ Ł(Φ(ω′)) and Ai(ω′) ⊆
Ł(Φ(ω)). Since Ki is an equivalence relation, it partitions
the states in Ω. Thus, we can define Ki by describing the
partition. (In the economics literature, this partition is called
i’s information partition.) For the remainder of the pa-
per, we assume (as is standard in the literature) that agents
know what they are aware of, so that if ω ∈ Ki(ω′), then
Ai(ω) = Ai(ω′), and that each Ki is an equivalence rela-
tion, and thus partitions the states in Ω. We can defineKi by
describing this partition, called i’s information partition in
the economics literature.
Given these assumptions, we can now explain why we
need different languages at different states. Consider an
agent who considers it possible that she is aware of the
whole language. Thus, the agent considers possible a state
ω′ such that Ai(ω′) = Φ(ω′). If we used the same language
at all states, because the agent knows what she is aware of,
that would mean that, at all states that the agent considered
possible, she would know the whole language. Thus, if an
agent is aware of all formulas, then she would know that she
is aware of all formulas. This is a rather unreasonable prop-
erty of awareness. It was precisely to avoid this property that
Halpern and Rego (2013) allowed different languages to be
associated with different states.
We can also explain our use of standard names. Note that
to give semantics to ∀xϕ and ∀Y ϕ, we do syntactic replace-
ments. In the case of ∀xϕ, we consider all ways of replacing
x by a constant; in the case of ∀Y ϕ, we consider all ways
of replacing Y by a Boolean combination of properties.
This is critical because we define awareness syntactically.
Consider a formula such as ∀Y Ai(Y (d)). The standard ap-
proach to giving semantics to such a quantified formula
would say, roughly speaking, that (M,ω) |= ∀Y Ai(Y (d)) if
(M,ω) |= Ai(Y (d)) no matter which set of objects Y repre-
sents. The “no matter which property (i.e., set of objects) Y
represents” would typically be captured by including a val-
uation V on the left-hand side of |=, where V interprets Y
as a set of objects; we would then consider all valuations V
that agree on their interpretations of all predicate variables
but Y . Since we treat awareness syntactically, this approach
will not work. We need to replace Y by a syntactic object
and then evaluate whether agent i is aware of the resulting
formula. This is exactly what we do: (M,ω) |= Ai(Y (d)) if
(M,ω) |= Ai(ψ(d)) for ψ ∈ Lbc(Φ(ω)).
A sentence ϕ is satisfiable if there exists a modelM and
a state ω in M such that (M,ω) |= ϕ. Given a model M ,
ϕ is valid in M , denoted M |= ϕ, if (M,ω) |= ϕ for all
ω ∈ Ω such that ϕ ∈ Ł(Φ(ω)). Likewise, for some class of
models N , ϕ is valid in N , denoted N |= ϕ, if N |= ϕ for
all N ∈ N . Note that when we consider the validity of ϕ,
we follow Halpern and Reˆgo (2013) in requiring only that ϕ
be true in states ω such that ϕ ∈ Ł(Φ(ω)). Thus, ϕ is valid
if ϕ is true in all states ω where ϕ is part of the language of
ω; we are not interested in whether ϕ is true if ϕ is not in
the language (indeed, ϕ is guaranteed not to be true in this
case).
This completes our description of the syntax and seman-
tics. Our language is quite expressive. Among other things,
we can faithfully embed in it the propositional approach
considered by HR and the object-based awareness approach
of Board and Chung (2009). In more detail, HR consider a
propositional logic of knowledge and awareness, which al-
lows existential quantification over propositions, so has for-
mulas of the form ∃X(Ai(X)∧¬Aj(X)) (there is a formula
that agent i is aware of that agent j is not aware of). We can
capture the HR language by replacing each primitive propo-
sition p by the atomic formula P (d), for some fixed stan-
dard name d, and replacing each proposition variable X by
X(d). This replacement allows us to convert a formula ϕ in
the HR language to a sentence ϕr in our language (the HR
language has no analogue of concepts). We can then convert
an HR modelM to a modelM r in our framework by using
the same set of states, taking Ø = {d}, and taking C = ∅,
so that there are no concepts and a single object. It is easy
to see that (M,ω) |= ϕ iff (M r, ω) |= ϕr. We can also
accommodate the object-based awareness models of Board
and Chung (2009). Here the construction is more straight-
forward: a model where C = ∅ and Pω = P for all states
ω will do the trick.
3 Utility under introspective unawareness
In order to explore how the appeal to conceptsmight be valu-
able in a contracting environment,we must add a bit of struc-
ture to our problem, dictating the agents’ preferences when
they are unaware. This is more complicated than in previous
work because we have unawareness of properties. Thus, un-
less the agent knows that she is aware of all properties, it is
always possible there exists some property that she is un-
aware of.
We focus on a setting that makes sense for contracting:
namely, one where an agent’s utility is determined by which
set of objects he ends up with. We further simplify things
by assuming that the utility of a set of objects is separable,
so it is the sum of the utility of the individual objects. Thus,
there is no complementarity or substitutability (e.g., it is not
the case that the objects are a left shoe and a right shoe, so
that having one shoe is useless, while having both has high
utility); each agent’s preferences can be characterized by a
utility function defined on objects.
In this section, we consider various assumptions on the
utility function, which, roughly speaking, correspond to dif-
ferent ways of saying that all that an agent cares about are
the properties and concepts in the agent’s language that the
objects satisfy. In the next section, we consider the conse-
quences of these assumptions on a contracting scenario.
Fix a modelM = (Ω, D,Φ,A1 . . . ,An,K1, . . . ,Kn, I)
over a language Ł(Ø,P,C ). Let U = {Ui,ω : D →
R}i∈{1...n},ω∈Ω describe the agents’ preferences; specifi-
cally, Ui,ω describes agent i’s preferences in world ω by
associating with each object its utility (a real number).
Define, for notational expediency, the maps PROPω :
D → P and CONω : D → C by taking PROPω(d) =
{P ∈ Pω : d ∈ P Iω} and CONω(d) = {C ∈ Cω : d ∈ C
I
ω}.
Thus, PROPω and CONω take a domain element to the set
of properties (resp., concepts) it satisfies at ω. Further de-
fine PROPAiω (d) = PROPω(d) ∩ Ai(ω) and CON
Ai
ω (d) =
CONw(d) ∩ Ai(ω); thus PROPAiω and CON
Ai
ω are the restric-
tions of PROPw and CONw to agent i’s awareness.
Our assumptions relate the agents’ preferences over do-
main elements to the properties (and concepts) that these
elements possess. Because we allow for introspection, it is
possible for an agent to care about aspects of an object that
she is unaware of, although she will not be able to articu-
late exactly why she has such a preference. Thus, we take as
a starting point the minimal restriction ensuring an agent’s
subjective valuation depends only on properties and con-
cepts that the agent can articulate.
A1. For all d, d′ ∈ D and all states ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, if PROPω(d) =
PROPω′(d
′) then Ui,ω(d) = Ui,ω′(d
′).
A1 can be viewed as the conjunction of two assumptions:
first, if two different objects d and d′ possess exactly the
same properties at a state ω, then they are valued identi-
cally at ω; second, if a given object d has the same prop-
erties at two different states ω and ω′, then d has the same
value at both ω and ω′. Since each concept is defined (at
a possible state) as a Boolean combination of properties,
if two objects satisfy the same properties then they must
also be instances of the same concepts. Thus, A1 is equiv-
alent to the assumption that if PROPω(d) = PROPω′(d) and
CONω(d) = CONω′(d
′) then Ui,ω(d) = Ui,ω′(d
′).
Under A1, an agent does not care about the label assigned
to an object—if d and d′ satisfy the same properties (and so
the same concepts) the agent does not care that d is called
“d” and d′ called “d′”. A1 also rules out social preferences,
or preferences that depend on epistemic conditions. For ex-
ample, A1 does not allow agent i to value an object d accord-
ing to agent j’s valuation, or even agent j’s current knowl-
edge of i’s valuations, although this might be relevant if i is
interested in reselling d to j. Finally, A1 rules out the case
where an agent values the same properties differently in dif-
ferent states.
A1 allows an agent to value d and d′ differently even if she
can express no distinction between d and d′ (conditional on
the state. This can happen if d and d′ differ on properties that
the agent is unaware of. Our next assumption reduces this
flexibility in valuations, mandating that an agent’s valuation
depends only on aspects of the state of which she is aware.
A2. If PROPAiω (d) = PROP
Ai
ω′ (d
′) and CONAiω (d) =
CON
Ai
ω′ (d
′) then Ui,ω(d) = Ui,ω′(d
′).
A2 says that the DM’s valuation of objects cannot differ
unless the objects are distinguished in some way the agent is
aware of. If two objects are the same in every way that the
agent can articulate, then she assigns them the same value. It
is consistent with A2 that an agent i ascribes different util-
ities to d and d′ even though i is not aware of any property
that distinguishes d and d′. This can happen if d and d′ sat-
isfy different concepts. In that case, i knows that some prop-
erty must distinguish d and d′, but it is a property that i is not
aware of. For instance, an agent might value a quantum com-
puter more than a conventional one even when she does not
understand exactly how to define a quantum computer. As
this discussion shows, unlike A1, in A2 we must explicitly
refer to concepts; even though concepts are built from prop-
erties, the agent can be aware of concepts that are defined by
properties that the agent is not aware of.
A3. If PROPAiω (d) = PROP
Ai
ω′ (d
′) then Ui,ω(d) = Ui,ω′(d
′).
A3 says that an agent bases her preferences only on the
properties of which she is aware (and not concepts). A3 can
be thought of as a principle of neutrality towards unaware-
ness; although two objects are distinguishable (say d is an
instance of C while d′ is not), the agent values them iden-
tically as long as they are not distinguishable by properties
that the agent is aware of. That is, while the agent knows
there must be a property that separates d and d′, because she
is unaware of such a property, so she places no value on it.
For example, while the agent might understand that there is
a difference between classical and quantum computers, be-
cause she does not understand how these entities differ, she
values them equally. It is immediate that A3 implies both
A1 and A2. Moreover, in a model without unawareness of
properties or concepts, A1, A2, and A3 collapse to the same
restriction.
While it may at first seem unreasonable to base prefer-
ences on properties of which you are unaware (as is allowed
by A1), it actually is not so uncommon. People may prefer
stock d to d′ although they cannot articulate a reason that d is
better. Nevertheless, because they see other people buying d
and not d′, they assume that there is some significant prop-
erty P of d (of which they are not aware) that d′ does not
possess that accounts for other people’s preferences. This
can be modeled using the fact that different states have dif-
ferent languages associated with them. An agent i might not
be aware of P at a world ω, but considers a world ω′ pos-
sible such that P (d) holds and P (d′) does not. Moreover,
he considers P a “good” property; objects that have prop-
erty P get a higher utility than those that do not, all else
being equal. We remark that such reasoning certainly seems
to play a role in the high valuation of some cryptocurren-
cies! Of course, if i has a predicate in the language that says
“other people like it”, then d and d′ might be distinguishable
using that predicate. This observation emphasizes the fact
that A1 and A2 are very much language-dependent. If the
agent cannot express various properties in his language, then
he may not be able to make distinctions relevant to prefer-
ences. (See (Bjorndahl, Halpern, and Pass 2013) for an ap-
proach to game theory and decision theory that assumes that
utilities are determined by the description of a state in some
language.)
4 Contracts and conceptual unawareness
We now consider the effect of A1, A2, and A3 on simple in-
terpersonal contracts. Unlike the bulk of the Economics lit-
erature, where contracts are functions from a state space to
outcomes, we here take a contract to be a syntactic object—
it makes direct reference to the language of our logic. Real
world contracts are syntactic, in that they must literally ar-
ticulate the contingencies on which they are based. But our
motivation for considering syntactic contracts is more than
a pursuit of descriptive accuracy. In models of unawareness,
the set of contingencies that can be contracted on is a direct
consequence of what agents can articulate. So, by consider-
ing the language that the agents use, we can directly examine
the welfare implications of awareness.6
Suppose that we have two agents, 1 and 2. LetM be the
model that describes their uncertainty and awareness, and
suppose that their preferences are characterized by U . As-
sume that agent i is initially endowed with the set of do-
main elements End i, for i = 1, 2, where End1 and End2
are disjoint. For simplicity, we assume (as is standard) that
each agent will consume (i.e., use) exactly one object. With-
out trade, each agent can consume only an object from her
own endowment; with trade, they may be able to do bet-
ter. Let End1⊕End2 denote all pairs (d1, d2) of elements in
End1 ∪ End2 such that d1 6= d2. Note that we might have
(d1, d2) ∈ End1∪End2 even if d1 and d2 are both in End2
(and not in End1); the agents may both consume something
that was in agent 2’s initial endowment.
A contract is a pair 〈Λ, c〉, where Λ is a finite set of sen-
tences and c is a function from Λ to End1⊕End2. Let ci
denote the ith component of c; that is, if c(λ) = (d1, d2),
then ci(λ) = di. The intuition is that ci dictates which ob-
ject should be consumed by agent i, contingent on the truth
of the sentences inΛ. Given a modelM , contract 〈Λ, c〉must
satisfy
1. M |=
∨
ϕ∈Λ ϕ, and
2. M |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) for all distinct sentences ϕ, ψ ∈ Λ.
6For contracts that do not involve concepts, what we are doing
could also be done in a purely semantic framework, for example,
that of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006). However, contracts
that involve concepts cannot be expressed in a purely semantic
framework, since concepts represent syntactic objects. Agents can
be aware of a concept without being aware of the properties that
the concept represents (as in the case of quantum computers); be-
cause of this, concepts allow us to indirectly get at awareness of
unawareness. Awareness of unawareness seems difficult to express
in a purely semantic framework (and, indeed, cannot be expressed
in the framework of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper). It seems to us
that the use of concepts is indispensable in understanding how un-
awareness drives novel behavior in contracting environments; this
is one of our reasons for modeling unawareness syntactically. Syn-
tactic contracts were considered by Piermont (2017), with similar
motivation.
The first condition states that some sentence in Λ is true
in every state (so the contract is complete), the second that
the true sentence is unique at every state (so the contract is
well defined). A contract is articulable in state ω∗, some-
times denoted ω∗-articulable, if Λ ⊆ Ł(A1(ω∗)∩A2(ω∗)),
that is, if both agents are aware of all the statements in the
contract. (Presumably, the act of reading the contract makes
them aware all the statements even if they weren’t aware of
them beforehand.7) Note that if a contract is articulable in
ω∗ then Λ ⊆ Ł(Φ(ω∗)).
By conditions 1 and 2, in each state ω, there is a unique
sentence in Λ that is true in ω: call that sentence ϕω. We
take the outcome of the contract in state ω to be c(ϕω). We
abuse notation and write c(ω) = (c1(ω), c2(ω)) to denote
the outcome of the contract in state ω. Thus, the value of the
contract to agent i in state ω is Ui,ω(ci(ω)).
We are interested in the value of concepts as a contract-
ing device. To get at this, we must examine the difference
between the optimal (or equilibrium) contract when Λ can
be any subset of the language and the optimal (or equilib-
rium) contract when Λ cannot refer to concepts. Given M ,
U , and endowments End1,End2 ⊆ D, say that a contract
〈Λ, c〉 is ω-efficient if there is no pair of objects (d1, d2) ∈
End1⊕End2 such that
Ui,ω(di)) ≥ Ui,ω(ci(ω))
for i ∈ {1, 2}, with at least one inequality strict, and efficient
if it is ω-efficient for all ω ∈ Ω. In other words, a contract
is efficient if it realizes all the gains from trade, so there is
no trade that would leave both agents better off. Finally, a
contract is ω-acceptable for agent i if
Ui,ω′(c(ω)) ≥ max
d∈Endi
Ui,ω′(d)
for all ω′ ∈ Ki(ω). Agent i facing a take-it-or-leave-it of-
fer for an acceptable contract will prefer that contract to her
outside option (i.e., consuming an object in End i).
The following examples illustrate how limited awareness
can impede the efficiency of contracts and how the reference
to concepts can help an agent articulate her preference, tem-
pering the effect of unawareness.
Example 4.1. A buyer (agent 1) is trying to purchase a com-
puter from a firm (agent 2). End1 = {d$} and End2 =
{dcmp}, where d$ is a fixed amount of money and dcmp
is the computer in question. There are three states: Ω =
{ω1, ω2, ω3}. There are three predicates, P = {P,Q,R}.
We have RIω1 = R
I
ω2
= RIω3 = {d
$}; in addition, P Iω1 =
P Iω2 = Q
I
ω1
= {dcmp} and P Iω3 = Q
I
ω2
= QIω3 = ∅, so that,
in the three states, dcmp has propertiesP andQ, propertyP ,
and no properties, respectively. There is also a single con-
cept, that of a quantum computer, QC: QCIω1 = QC
I
ω2
=
P ∧ Q and QCIω3 = ¬P ∧ ¬Q ∧ ¬R. Therefore c is an
instance of QC in states ω1 and ω3. The buyer prefers to
7The fact that agents might not be aware of all statements in a
contract before the contract is written clearly has strategic implica-
tions. Agent 1 may prefer to leave a clause out of a contract rather
than making agent 2 aware of the issue. This issue is studied to
some extent by Filiz (2012) and Ozbay (2007).
purchase the computer if and only if it has propertyQ; thus,
the buyer’s utility is such that U1,ω1(d
cmp) > U1,ω1(d
$)
and U1,ωk(d
$) > U1,ωk(d
cmp) for k ∈ {2, 3}. Moreover,
Ui,ω(d
$) = Ui,ω′(d
$) for all agents i and states ω, ω′. The
firm wants to sell the computer in all states. For now, as-
sume that both agents have full awareness, and their infor-
mation partitions are given by K1 =
{
{ω1, ω2, ω3}
}
and
K2 =
{
{ω1, ω2}, {ω3}
}
. Since there is no unawareness,
this model trivially satisfies A3 (and hence A1 and A2). Be-
cause the buyer does not know the state, she is unwilling
to make any unconditional trade (all constant contracts are
unacceptable for the buyer). However, this is easily reme-
died by the use of a contract. The obvious contract, where
Λ = {Q(dcmp),¬Q(dcmp) and the function c is given by
Q(dcmp) 7→ (dcmp, d$)
¬Q(dcmp) 7→ (d$, dcmp),
is clearly efficient and acceptable to all parties.
Example 4.1 highlights how contracting can facilitate
trade in uncertain environments. Despite the fact that agents
do not know which state has obtained, they can eliminate
uncertainty by appealing to contracts. The next example il-
lustrates the issues that arise when awareness is limited.
Example 4.2. Let M and U be as in Example 4.1, except
that now that agents are not completely aware. Specifically,
Ai(ω) = (Ø, {P,R},C ) for all ω ∈ Ω and i ∈ {1, 2}.
Both agents are unaware of Q. This model satisfies assump-
tions A1 and A2, but not A3. The contract described in the
previous example is no longer articulable. We can circum-
vent the agents’ linguistic limitations by writing a contract in
terms of the conceptQC. Indeed, the consider (Λ, c), where
Λ = {P (dcmp) ∧Q(dcmp),¬(P (dcmp ∧Q(dcmp)) and c is
given by
P (dcmp) ∧QC(dcmp) 7→ (dcmp, d$)
¬
(
P (dcmp) ∧QC(dcmp)
)
7→ (d$, dcmp),
implements the same consumption outcomes as the contract
in Example 4.1.
In Example 4.2, the buyer wants to purchase dcmp only
when Q(dcmp) is true. Since she is unaware of the prop-
erty Q, and knows only that there is some property (that
is a conjunct of QC) that is desirable, she cannot directly
demand a computer with property Q. Before analyzing the
contract above, notice if the buyer knew the true state was
not ω3, then she could get away with the simple contract
that demands dcmp wheneverQC(dcmp) is true. In states ω1
and ω2, the interpretation of QC is constant, and, given that
P (dcmp) is true in both states, QC(dcmp) is equivalent to
Q(dcmp) in these states, so the buyer could use the concept
of a quantum computer as a proxy for the propertyQ.
This simpler contract is not acceptable when the buyer
considers all three states possible. In state ω3, the inter-
pretation of a quantum computer is different, so that while
dcmp is an instance of QC in ω3, it does not satisfy Q. The
buyer is uncertain about the definition of a quantum com-
puter; while she is unaware of the exact definition in each
state, she can articulate the difference: in some states, P is
a property of quantum computers, while in others it is not.
By exploiting this difference, she can construct the welfare-
optimal contract—she demands dcmp whenever it possesses
the property that defines a quantum computer in addition to
P .
These examples show how the awareness of agents can
affect the set of trading outcomes that can be implemented
via (syntactic) contracts. Collectively, they suggest a con-
nection between the efficacy of contracting and the relation-
ship between preference and properties as embodied by as-
sumptions A1–A3. Under the additional assumption that the
agents are aware of the same things in the actual world (a
reasonable assumption if we assume that the language talks
only about contract-relevant features, and both agents have
read the contract, so are aware of all the properties and con-
cepts that the contract mentions), this connection is made
formal in the following result, whose proof (like that of all
other theorems) is left to the full paper, which can be found
on arxiv.
Theorem 4.1. Given a model M =
(Ω, D,Φ,A1 . . . ,An,K1, . . . ,Kn, I), preferences U ,
endowments End1,End2 ⊆ D, and a state ω
∗ ∈ Ω such
that A1(ω∗) = A2(ω∗) and K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) is finite, the
following hold:
(a) If 〈M,U〉 satisfies A1 and A2, then there exists a contract
that is ω∗-articulable, ω∗-efficient, and ω∗-acceptable for
i = 1, 2.
(b) If in addition, for i = 1, 2, Ai is constant on K1(ω∗) ∪
K2(ω
∗), then there exists a contract that is ω∗-articulable,
ω′-efficient, and ω′-acceptable for all ω′ ∈ K1(ω∗) ∪
K2(ω∗).
(c) If in addition 〈M,U〉 satisfies A3, then there exists a con-
tract 〈Λ, c〉 that is ω∗-articulable, ω′-efficient, and ω′-
acceptable for i at all ω′ ∈ K1(ω
∗) ∪ K2(ω
∗) such that
Λ ⊆ Lbc .
Theorem 4.1(a) says that if agents’ preferences can de-
pend only on properties and concepts that they are aware of,
then gains from trade can be fully realized. Even if agents
are unaware of some preference-relevant properties, as long
as they do not strictly prefer one object to another without
being aware of some tangible way that the objects differ,
then they can still articulate an optimal contract. As Exam-
ple 4.2 shows, this contract might need to mention concepts.
Part (b) states that if, in addition, each agent knows what
the other is aware of, then each of them knows that gains
from trade can be achieved. That is, both agents know that,
no matter what the true state of the world is (from their per-
spective), trading is worthwhile. Theorem 4.1(c) says that if
agents’ preferences depend only on the properties that they
are aware of, then they gain nothing from the ability to con-
tract over concepts; there is a contract that they know to be
efficient that makes reference only to properties.
Theorem4.1 requires agents to be aware of the same prop-
erties in ω∗. As we argued above, this is a reasonable as-
sumption. As seen by the following example, the assumption
is also necessary.
Example 4.3. Let End1 = {d1} and End2 = {d2}. Con-
sider a language with three predicate symbols P , Q, and R.
LetM be a model with three states, ω1, ω2, and ω3, where
P Iω1 = {d1}, Q
I
ω3
= {d2}, P Iω2 = P
I
ω3
= QIω1 = Q
I
ω2
= ∅,
RIω = {d1} for all states ω, the only information set for
both agents is {ω1, ω2, ω3} (so both agents consider all three
worlds possible at all worlds),A1(ω) = (Ø, {P,R}, ∅), and
A2(ω) = (Ø, {Q,R}, ∅) for each state ω. Now consider
what happens when agent 1 wants d1 only when it has prop-
erty P (so wants to trade in states ω2, ω3) and agent 2 wants
d2 only when it has property Q (so wants to trade in states
ω1 and ω2). Thus, an efficient contract must induce trade in
state ω2 and an acceptable contract cannot induce trade ex-
cept in state ω2. However, neither agent alone can propose
such a contract. From agents 1’s perspective, states ω2 and
ω3 are indistinguishable in the sense that all objects that he
is aware of satisfy the same properties in both states, and
from 2’s perspective, ω1 and ω2 are indistinguishable.
5 Axiomatization and complexity
We can adapt the axioms used by Halpern and Reˆgo (2013)
to get a sound and complete axiomatization for our logic,
provided that the set P of predicates is infinite. This as-
sumption seems reasonable, given that we are mainly inter-
ested in agents who are never sure that they are aware of all
predicates. (HR make an analogous assumption.)
Consider the following axiom system, which we call AX.
Axioms:
Prop. All substitution instances of valid formulas of propo-
sitional logic.
AGP. Aiϕ⇔ (∧P∈P∩Φ(ϕ)AiP (x)) ∧ (∧C∈C∩Φ(ϕ)AiC(x)),
where x is an arbitrary object variable and Φ(ϕ) consists
of all the predicate and concept symbols in P ∪ C that
appear in ϕ.8
KA. Aiϕ⇒ KiAiϕ
K. (Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kiψ.
T. Kiϕ⇒ ϕ.
4. Kiϕ⇒ KiKiϕ.
5. (¬Kiϕ ∧ Aiϕ)⇒ Ki¬Kiϕ.
A0. Kiϕ⇒ Aiϕ.
Con. ∃X(∀x(C(x)⇔ X(x))).
1∀x ∀xψ ⇒ ψ[x/c] for c ∈ Ø.
1∀X . ∀Xϕ⇒ ϕ[X/ψ] if ψ is either in L
bc or a concept.
K∀x. ∀x(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (∀xϕ⇒ ∀xψ).
K∀X . ∀X(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (∀Xϕ⇒ ∀Xψ).
N∀x. ϕ⇒ ∀xϕ if x is not free in ϕ.
N∀X . ϕ⇒ ∀Xϕ if X is not free in ϕ.
Barcanx. ∀xKiϕ⇒ Ki∀xϕ.
8As usual, the empty conjunction is taken to be vacuously true,
so that Aiϕ is vacuously true if there are no symbols in P ∪ C
occur in ϕ.
BarcanX . (Ai(∀Xϕ) ∧ ∀X(Ai(X(c))) ⇒ Kiϕ) ⇒
Ki(∀XAi(X(c))⇒ ∀Xϕ).
FAX . ∀X¬Ai(X(c))⇒ Ki(∀X¬Ai(X(c))).
Finx. If Ø = {c1, . . . , cn}, then ∀xϕ ⇔ ϕ[x/c1] ∧ . . . ∧
ϕ[x/cn].
Rules of Inference:
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ (modus ponens).
GenK . From ϕ ∧Aiϕ inferKiϕ.
Gen∀x . From ϕ infer ∀xϕ[c/x], where c ∈ Ø.
Gen∀X . If P is a predicate symbol, then from ϕ infer
∀Xϕ[P/X ].
Theorem 5.1. AX is a sound and complete axiomatization
of Ł(Ø,P,C ) with respect to the class of models of partial
awareness, if P is infinite.
Since the logic is axiomatizable, the validity problem is
recursively enumerable. This is also a lower bound on its
complexity, even if we do not allow quantification over pred-
icates, since first-order epistemic logic with just two unary
predicates was shown by Kripke (1962) to be undecidable.
Kripke’s proof used the well-known fact that first-order logic
with a single binary predicate R is undecidable, and the ob-
servation that R(x, y) can be represented as ¬K¬(P (x) ∧
Q(y)). (We must add the formula ∀x(A(P (x) ∧ Q(x)) to
ensure that awareness does not cause a problem.) We thus
get Thus,
Theorem 5.2. The validity problem for the language
Ł(Ø,P,C ) in the class of models of partial awareness is
r.e.-complete if |P| ≥ 2.
6 Conclusion
We have defined and axiomatized a modal logic that cap-
tures partial unawareness by allowing an agent to be aware
of a concept without being aware of the properties that de-
fine it. The logic also allows agents to reason about their own
unawareness. We show that such a logic is critical for ana-
lyzing interpersonal contracts, and that referencing concepts
that agents are only partially aware of can improve welfare.
We believe that the logic should also be applicable to other
domains, such an analyzing communication between people.
We hope to consider such applications in the future.
We are also interested in analyzing dynamic aspects of
awareness, and applying this to contracts. Our analysis of
contracts assumed that both agents were aware of all state-
ments in a contract. This makes sense after the contract has
been signed, but may well not be true before the contract
is written. We believe that an extension of our language to
deal with the effects of making other agents aware of cer-
tain formulas will allow us explore and analyze the dynamic
process of contract writing.
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7 More on contracts
In this section, we expand on the discussion of contracts in
Section 4. We start with the proof of Theorem 4.1. For the
reader’s convenience, we repeat the statement of the theo-
rem.
Theorem 4.1: Given a model M =
(Ω, D,Φ,A1 . . . ,An,K1, . . . ,Kn, I), preferences U ,
endowments End1,End2 ⊆ D, and a state ω∗ ∈ Ω such
that A1(ω∗) = A2(ω∗) and K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) is finite, the
following hold:
(a) If 〈M,U〉 satisfies A1 and A2, then there exists a contract
that is ω∗-articulable, ω∗-efficient, and ω∗-acceptable for
i = 1, 2.
(b) If in addition, for i = 1, 2, Ai is constant on K1(ω∗) ∪
K2(ω∗), then there exists a contract that is ω∗-articulable,
ω′-efficient, and ω′-acceptable for all ω′ ∈ K1(ω∗) ∪
K2(ω∗).
(c) If in addition 〈M,U〉 satisfies A3, then there exists a con-
tract 〈Λ, c〉 that is ω∗-articulable, ω′-efficient, and ω′-
acceptable for i at all ω′ ∈ K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) such that
Λ ⊆ Lbc .
Proof. Define an equivalence relation ∼ on states by taking
ω ∼ ω′ ff ω and ω′ agree on all sentences that the agents are
aware of in state ω∗ (recall that the agents are aware of the
same sentences in ω∗); that is, ω ∼ ω′ if
{ϕ ∈Ł : (M,ω) |= ϕ, (M,ω∗) |= A1ϕ} =
{ϕ ∈ Ł : (M,ω′) |= ϕ, (M,ω∗) |= A1ϕ}.
(Note that since A1(ω′∗) = A2(ω∗) by assumption, we
could replace either occurrence of A1 above by A2 with-
out affecting∼.) For each ω ∈ Ω, let [ω] denote the ω’s cell,
that is, the set of states ∼-equivalent to ω.
Lemma 7.1. Let κ : Ω → End1⊕End2 be a function such
that κ−1((d1, d2)) is a union of ∼-cells for all (d1, d2) ∈
End1⊕End2. Then for all finite subsetsΩ′ ofΩ, there exists
a ω∗-articulable contract 〈Λ, c〉 such that c(ω) = κ(ω) for
all ω ∈ Ω′.
Proof. Fix a finite subset Ω′ = {w1, . . . , ωn} ⊆ Ω. First
suppose that ωi 6∼ ωj for i 6= j, so that for all i, j ≤ n,
i 6= j, there exists a sentence ϕij ∈ Ł(A1(ω∗) ∩ A2(ω∗))
such that (M,ωi) |= ϕij and (M,ωj) 6|= ϕij . For each i ≤ n
let ψi =
∧
{j 6=i} ϕi,j . For i = 1, . . . , n, let
λi =
∧
j 6=i
¬ψj ∧ ψi;
let λn+1 = ∧
n
i=1¬λi. Thus, for i = 1, . . . , n, λi is true at
ωi and not true at ωj if j 6= i. Moreover, the formulas λi
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; exactly one is true at
each state in Ω. Finally, let Λ = {λi : i ≤ n}∪ {
∧
i≤n ¬λi}
and define c by taking c(λi) = κ(ωi); c(
∧
i≤n ¬λi) can
be defined arbitrarily. Thus, (Λ, c) is a contract such that
c(ωi) = κ(ωi) for all i ≤ n.
Now consider an arbitrary finite subsetΩ′ ofΩ. LetΩ′′ be
a maximal subset of Ω′ that contains at most one element of
each ∼-cell. We can apply the construction above to Ω′′ to
get a ω∗-articulable contract (Λ, c) such that c(ω) = κ(ω)
for all ω ∈ Ω′′. We claim that in fact c(ω′) = κ(ω′) for all
ω′ ∈ Ω′. For if ω′ ∈ Ω′ − Ω′′, then ω′ ∼ ω for some ω ∈
Ω′′. By assumption, κ(ω′) = κ(ω), and by construction, we
must have c(ω′) = c(ω). Thus κ(ω′) = c(ω′). It follows
that c(ω′) = κ(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω′.
Lemma 7.2. If ω, ω′ ∈ Ki(w∗), w′ ∼ w, and U satisfies
A2, then Ui,ω′ = Ui,ω.
Proof. First notice that if w,w′ ∈ Ki(w∗), then Ai(ω) =
Ai(ω′) = Ai(ω∗). Thus, by the definition of ∼, if ω ∼ ω′,
then
{ϕ ∈ Ł : (M,ω) |= ϕ∧Aiϕ} = {ϕ ∈ Ł : (M,ω
′) |= ϕ∧Aiϕ},
implying that PROPAiω = PROP
Ai
ω′ and CON
Ai
ω = CON
Ai
ω′ .
The lemma follows immediately from A2.
For each ∼-cell [ω], define Ui,[ω] : D → R by taking
Ui,[ω] = Ui,ω′ for some ω
′ ∈ Ki(ω∗) ∩ [ω] if Ki(ω∗) ∩ [ω]
is nonempty, and define Ui,[ω] arbitrarily otherwise.
By Lemma 7.2, Ui,[ω] is well defined (in that it does not
depend on the choice of ω′). Define
κ(ω) ∈ argmax(d1,d2)∈End1⊕End2
{
U1,[ω](d1) + U2,[ω](d2) :
Ui,[ω](di) ≥ maxd∈Endi Ui,[ω](d), i = 1, 2
}
.
(1)
We assume that the elements of End1⊕End2 are ordered
so that if more than element in End1 ⊕ End2 is the argmax
in (1), we always choose the least one. This guarantees that
κ(ω) = κ(ω′) if ω ∼ ω′. Thus, by Lemma 7.1, there exists
a ω∗-articulable contract cˆ such that cˆ(ω) = κ(ω) for all
ω ∈ K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗). The next lemma shows that this
contract is acceptable and efficient, and thus establishes the
claim of part (a).
Lemma 7.3. The contract cˆ is ω∗-efficient and ω∗-
acceptable for i = 1, 2.
Proof. For ω ∈ Ki(ω∗), Ui,ω = Ui,[ω], so ω
∗-acceptability
follows from the constraint of the maximization problem
give by (1).
To see that cˆ is ω∗-efficient, suppose, by way of contra-
diction, that there exists (d1, d2) ∈ End1⊕End2 such that
Ui,ω∗(di)) ≥ Ui,ω∗(cˆi(ω
∗)) = Ui,ω∗(κi(ω
∗))
for i = 1, 2, with at least one inequality strict. Since ω∗ ∈
K1(ω∗) ∩ K2(ω∗), Ui,ω∗ = Ui,[ω∗] for i = 1, 2. It follows
that (d1, d2) satisfies the constraints given by (1). But, since
one inequality is strict, we have
U1,[ω∗](d1) + U2,[ω∗](d2) >
U1,[ω∗](κ1([ω
∗])) + U2,[ω∗]((κ2([ω
∗]),
contradicting the definition of κ. Hence no such (d1, d2) ex-
ists, and cˆ is ω∗-efficient.
Part (a) of Theorem 4.1 follows from Lemma 7.3. For part
(b), note that if Ai is constant on K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) for i =
1, 2, Lemma 7.2 can be strengthened to show that if ω, ω′ ∈
K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) then Ui,ω = Ui,ω′ . The rest of the proof
follows follows immediately from the added assumption that
Ai is constant on K1(ω∗) ∪ K2(ω∗) for i = 1, 2. The rest
of the proof follows the proof of part (a) with the obvious
adjustments.
For part (c), we consider a coarsening of ∼ that identifies
states that agree on all sentences ϕ(d) with ϕ ∈ Lbc that the
agents are aware of in ω∗. More precisely, ω ∼bc ω′ if
{ϕ(d) : ϕ ∈ Lbc, (M,ω) |= ϕ(d), (M,ω∗) |= A1ϕ(d)} =
{ϕ(d) : ϕ ∈ Lbc, (M,ω′) |= ϕ(d), (M,ω∗) |= A1ϕ(d)}.
The proof follows that of part (a) except the analogue of
Lemma 7.1 uses ∼bc-cells and in Lemma 7.2, we appeal to
A3 rather than A2.
8 More on the axiom system
Some comments on the axioms and rules of inference: AGP
follows from our assumption that awareness is generated
from primitives: agent i is aware of ϕ exactly if i is aware of
all the constant, predicate, and concept symbols in ϕ, and the
assumption that agents are aware of all the constant symbols
in Ø. KA captures the fact that agents know what they are
aware of. T, 4, and 5 are the standard axioms of knowledge
(when knowledge is characterized by an equivalence rela-
tion), but 5 must be modified to deal with lack of awareness;
the approach for doing so goes back to Fagin and Halpern
(1988). A0 captures the fact that to (explicitly) know ϕ, i
must be aware of ϕ. 1∀x, 1∀X , N∀x, N∀X , K∀x, and K∀X
are standard adaptations of axioms for first-order logic, al-
though we remark that the validity of 1∀x depends on the
fact that the constants d have the same interpretation in all
states (otherwise ∀xKi(P (x)) ⇒ Ki(P (c)) would not be
valid).
The Barcanx axiom is a standard axiom of first-order
modal logic. The converse is true as well (and provable from
the other axioms). However, its validity depends on the fact
that all the objects in Ø are in the language of each state.
As observed by HR, the analogue for predicate variables
does not hold. For example, suppose that the only predi-
cate symbol in Φ(ω) is P agent i is aware of P at ω. It is
easy to see that (since agents know what they are aware of)
∀XKiAi(X(c)) holds at ω. However, if i considers a world
ω′ such that Φ(ω′) includes Q and i is not aware of Q at
ω′, thenKi(∀XAi(X(c))) does not hold at ω. As discussed
by HR, BarcanX is essentially the closest approximation to
the Barcan formula that we can get in models. To under-
stand it, suppose that ϕ is a formula with a free predicate
variable X . Then BarcanX says that if, in a state ω, agent
i is aware of all the predicates in ϕ and if, no matter what
formula ψ ∈ Lbc ∩ Φ(ω) is substituted for X in ϕ, if i is
aware of all the predicates in ψ, then i knows ϕ[X/ψ], then
in any state ω′ that i considers possible where i is aware of
all predicates (so that Φ(ω′) just includes those predicates
that i is aware of), ∀Xϕ holds. It is not hard to see that this
is sound.
In general, the axiom¬Ai(ϕ))⇒ Ki(¬Aiϕ) is not valid;
If an agent is not aware of a sentence, then she can’t know it,
since we are working with explicit knowledge (even though
¬Aiϕ is true in all the worlds that the agent considers pos-
sible. FAX (which essentially already appears in HR) gives
a weak version of that axiom; it says that if the agent is not
aware of any predicates, then she knows that. The sound-
ness of Finx is clear. Note that if Ø is infinite, there is no
corresponding axiom.
Although MP is standard, it is not obviously sound. To
understand the problem, suppose that ϕ and ψ are sentences
such that ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ are valid. To show that MP is
sound, we would have to show that ϕ is valid. Suppose not.
Then there is a model M∗ and state ω∗ in M∗ such that
(M∗, ω∗) |= ¬ψ. If (M∗, ω∗) |= ϕ and (M∗, ω∗) |= ϕ ⇒
ψ, then we have an immediate contradiction. Unfortunately,
despite the validity of ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ, we cannot conclude
that (M∗, ω∗) |= ϕ and that (M∗, ω∗) |= ϕ ⇒ ψ. These
sentences might not be in the language at state ω. The as-
sumption that P is infinite allows us to deal with this diffi-
culty.
We now prove Theorem 5.1, which says that AX is a
sound and complete axiomatization if the set P of predi-
cates is infinite. Since the proof follows exactly the same
lines as the HR soundness and completeness proof, we fo-
cus here on the main differences.
Soundness is straightforward, with the exception of MP,
Gen∀x , Gen∀X , and BarcanX . The soundness of MP is
proved in Lemma A.1, Proposition A.1, and Corollaries
A.1 and A.2 in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2013), under the as-
sumption that the set of primitive propositions is infinite;
the soundness of BarcanX is proved in Proposition A.3
in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2013) (where the axiom is labeled
Barcan∗X). Essentially the identical proofs show soundness
in our setting. We now prove that Gen∀x and Gen∀X are
sound.
Proposition 8.1. Gen∀x and Gen∀X are sound.
Proof. For Gen∀x , suppose that |= ϕ. We claim that we
must have |= ϕ[c/c′] for all constants c′. For suppose not.
Then there must be some model M and state ω such that
(M,ω) |= ¬ϕ[c/c′]. Let M ′ be a model just like M , but
with the roles of c and c′ reversed. Specifically, if IM and
IM
′
denote the interpretation functions of M and M ′, re-
spectively,9 then for each predicate P and each state ω, IM
′
is the result of replacing c in Pω by c
′ and replacing c′ in Pω
by c. It is easy to show, by induction on the structure of ψ,
that, for all sentences ψ, we have that (M,ω) |= ψ[c/c′]
iff (M ′, ω) |= ψ. (In doing the induction, we first con-
sider how many occurrences of ∀X , that is, how many in-
stances of quantification over predicates, there are in ψ,
and then do a subinduction on the length of ψ.) It follows
that (M ′, ω) |= ¬ϕ, contradicting the validity of ϕ. Thus,
|= ϕ[c/c′] for all constants c′, so |= ∀xϕ, as desired.
For Gen∀X , again suppose that |= ϕ. We want to show
that |= ∀Xϕ[P/X ]. Suppose not. Then there must be some
model M , state ω in M , and sentence ψ ∈ Lbc(ΦM (ω))
such that (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ[P/ψ]. Let M ′ be identical to M
except that, for each state ω′, (a) ΦM
′
(ω′) is the resulting
of adding P to ΦM
′
(ω′) iff ψ ∈ Ł(ΦM (ω′)); (b) IM
′
is
such that, for all c ∈ Ø, we have that (M ′, ω′) |= P (c) iff
(M,ω′) |= ψ(c); and (c) the awareness functions are such
that, for all agents i, (M ′, ω′) |= Ai(P (c)) iff (M,ω′) |=
Ai(ψ(c)). Intuitively, ψ plays the same role in M that P
does inM ′.
Then a straightforward induction on the structure of sen-
tences shows that for all states ω′ and all sentences ϕ′, we
have that (M,ω′) |= ϕ′[P/ψ] iff (M ′, ω′) |= ϕ′. Since,
by assumption, (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ[P/ψ], it follows (M ′, ω′) |=
¬ϕ, contradicting the validity of ϕ. Hence, we have that
∀Xϕ[P/X ], as desired.
For completeness, fix a language Ł(Ø,P,C )whereP is
infinite. We now list the major lemmas used by HR to prove
completeness, expanding only on the differences. As usual,
the idea of the completeness proof is to construct a canonical
9We use analogous notation consistently below.
modelM c where the worlds are maximal consistent sets of
sentences. We then show that if ωΓ is the world correspond-
ing to the maximal consistent set Γ, then (M c, ωΓ) |= ϕ
iff ϕ ∈ Γ. As observed in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2009), this
will not quite work in the presence of quantification; there
may be a maximal consistent set Γ of sentences such that
¬∀Xϕ ∈ Γ, but ϕ[X/ψ] ∈ Γ for all ψ ∈ Lbc . That is, there
is no witness to the falsity of ∀Xϕ in Γ. This problem was
dealt with in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2009) by restricting to max-
imal consistent sets Γ that are acceptable in the sense that if
¬∀Xϕ ∈ Γ, then ¬ϕ[X/q] ∈ Γ for infinitely many primi-
tive propositions q ∈ Φ. (Recall that HR consider a propo-
sitional language; this notion of acceptability requires the
language to include infinitely many primitive propositions,
as HR assumed it did.) As in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2013), be-
cause here we have possibly different languages associated
different worlds, we need to consider acceptability and max-
imality with respect to a language. The following definition
is adapted from (Halpern and Reˆgo 2013).
Definition 8.1. A sentence ϕ is provable from AX, denoted
AX ⊢ ϕ, if there is a sequence of sentences such that the last
one is ϕ, and each one is either an instance of an axiom of
AX or follows from previous sentences in the sequence by an
application of an inference rule. We write Γ ⊢ ϕ if there are
sentences β1, . . . , βm in Γ such that AX ⊢ (β1∧. . .∧βm)⇒
ϕ.
Definition 8.2. A set Γ of sentences is acceptable with re-
spect to the language Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) if, for all sentences
ϕ ∈ Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′), if Γ ⊢ ϕ[X/P ] for all but finitely predi-
cate symbols P ∈ P ′, then Γ ⊢ ∀Xϕ.
Definition 8.3. Γ is a maximal AX-consistent set of sen-
tences with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) ⊆ Ł(Ø,P,C ) if Γ is
an AX-consistent subset of Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) and, for all sen-
tences ϕ ∈ Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′), if Γ∪{ϕ} is AX-consistent, then
ϕ ∈ Γ.
The following four lemmas are essentially Lemmas A.4,
A.5, A.6, and A.7 in (Halpern and Reˆgo 2009). Since the
proofs are essentially identical, we do not repeat them here.
Lemma 8.1. If Γ is a finite set of sentences, then Γ is ac-
ceptable with respect to every language L(Ø,P ′,C ′) such
that P ′ is infinite.
Lemma 8.2. If Γ is acceptable with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′)
and ψ is a sentence in Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′), then Γ∪{ψ} is accept-
able with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′).
Lemma 8.3. If Γ ⊆ Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) is an acceptable AX-
consistent set of sentences with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′),
then Γ can be extended to a set of sentences that is
acceptable and maximal AX-consistent with respect to
Ł(Ø′,P ′,C ′).
Let Γ/Ki = {ϕ : Kiϕ ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 8.4. If Γ is a maximal AX-consistent set of sen-
tences with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) that contains¬Kiϕ and
Aiϕ, then Γ/Ki ∪ {¬ϕ} is AX-consistent.
The next lemma is essentially Lemma A.6 in
(Halpern and Reˆgo 2013), and again, its proof is al-
most identical. We say P ′ is co-infinite if P − P ′ is
infinite.
Lemma 8.5. If Γ is an acceptable maximal AX-consistent
set of sentences with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′), where P ′
is infinite and co-infinite, ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ, and Aiϕ ∈ Γ, then
there is an infinite and co-infinite set P ′′ of predicates and
a set ∆ of sentences that is an acceptable, maximal AX-
consistent set with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′′,C ′) and contains
Γ/Ki ∪ {¬ϕ}. Moreover, Aiψ ∈ ∆ iff Aiψ ∈ Γ for all
sentences ψ.
The following lemma is the one new lemma that we need
to deal with concepts and variables. It illustrates the role of
acceptability in the construction.
Lemma 8.6. If Γ is an acceptable maximal AX-consistent
set of sentences with respect to Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′) and C ∈
C ′, then there exists a sentence ψ ∈ Lbc(P ′) such that
∀x(C(x)⇔ ψ(x)) ∈ Γ.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is no
sentence ψ ∈ Lbc(P ′) such that ∀x(C(x) ⇔ ψ(x)) ∈ Γ.
Then, since Γ is maximal, for all predicates Q ∈ P ′, we
must have that ¬∀x(C(x) ⇔ Q(x)) ∈ Γ. Since Γ is ac-
ceptable, it follows that ∀X¬∀x(C(x) ⇔ X(x)) ∈ Γ.
But since Γ contains every instance of axiom Con, it con-
tains ∃X(∀x(C(x) ⇔ X(x))) (i.e., ¬∀X¬(∀x(C(x) ⇔
X(x))) ∈ Γ). Thus, Γ is inconsistent, a contradiction.
We now complete the completeness proof by con-
structing a canonical model, essentially as is done in
(Halpern and Reˆgo 2013).
Lemma 8.7. If ϕ is an AX-consistent sentence, then ϕ is
satisfiable.
Proof. We construct a canonical model where the worlds
are maximal consistent sets of sentences. However,
now the worlds must also explicitly include the lan-
guage, and we assume that the language associated
with each world is infinite and co-infinite. Let M c =
(Ωc, D,Φc,Ac1, . . . ,A
c
n,K
c
1, . . . ,K
c
n, I
c) be the canonical
awareness structure for Ł(Ø,P,C ), constructed as follows:
• Ωc = {(ωΓ,Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′)) : Γ is a set of sentences that
is acceptable and maximal AX-consistent with respect to
Ł(Ø,P ′,C ′), L(Ø,P ′,C ′) ⊆ Ł(Ø,P,C ), and P ′ is
infinite and co-infinite};
• D = Ø;
• Φc((ωΓ,Ł)) = Ł;
• AciωΓ,Ł) = {ψ : Aiψ ∈ Γ};
• Kci ((ωΓ,Ł)) = {(ω∆,Ł
′) : Γ/Xi ⊆ ∆ and Aiϕ ∈
Γ iff Aiϕ ∈ ∆ for all sentences ϕ};
• Ic
(ωΓ,Ł)
(P ) = {c : P (c) ∈ Γ};
• Ic
(ωΓ,Ł)
(C) = ψ if ∀x(C(x) ⇔ ψ(x)) ∈ Γ. (By
Lemma 8.6, there will be such a ψ; if there is one more
than one, we can pick the least one in some ordering of
formulas.)
Standard arguments now show that ψ ∈ Γ iff
(M c, (ωΓ,Ł)) |= ψ. It follows from Lemmas A.1 and
A.3 that every consistent sentence is in some acceptable
and maximal consistent set with respect to a language
Ł(O,P ′,C ′) such that P ′ is infinite and co-infinite. Thus,
if ϕ is consistent, there is some state (ωΓ,Ł) in the canonical
model such that (M c, (ωΓ,Ł)) |= ϕ. This proves the lemma
and the theorem.
